We, the undersigned, have decided to vote "No" on Friday and recommend that our fellow voters do so as well.

We each have slightly different reasons for our position but are agreed on what now follows.

Contrary to a common argument from our opponents, the Treaty is about much more than improving decision-making, but even if it was

The North Korean parliament is a marvel of efficient decision-making, as is a torch-wielding lynch mob. Neither is an attractive model for the EU

(The quotation is from "The Economist")

The Referendum Commission's work, while valuable, at best clarifies what is in this treaty. Given its complexity, there is an understandable tendency to conclude that, having reached some understanding of its contents and having failed to confirm one's worst fears, it is safe to vote for it. This is, sadly, no way to decide on the rules for our government. The treaty must also be seen in a larger context, especially that of its genesis.

None of the other groups opposed to the Treaty represent us adequately, and in the case of some, do not represent us at all. Nor, as is absolutely clear from polls and from last June's elections, do they represent the majority of "No" voters.

In deciding how to vote, the bad reasons on either side are irrelevant.

Some say that Lisbon is a bad deal for Ireland: we don't agree with this formulation of the problem at all. Our negotiators did a reasonable job.

C'est Magnifique! Mais C'est Ne Pas la Democratie

The EU's Constitution (for that is what the Treaties culminating in Lisbon amount to) has been developed, and continues to develop, without adequate democratic participation. Most regrettably, Lisbon was deliberately written to further preclude this. "The Economist", whose Europhile credentials are impeccable, had the integrity to note this as drafting proceeded. The titles of the relevant articles - Hee-hee Voters Fooled Again and Journalists for a Cover-up - must make any genuine democrat's blood run cold.

Public opinion in the EU states has not been able to arrive at an informed view on the merits of the Treaty because of the way in which it was written. Even to us, as lawyers accustomed to dealing with abstruse documents, the Treaty as signed is well-nigh unreadable. We recognise that some of this arose from the inherent difficulty of arriving at an agreement, but it is clear beyond dispute that the form in which the Treaty was signed was a function of the perceived necessity to disguise, or at least to "cosmetise", some aspects which would cause difficulty, especially for the people of the UK.

Voting "No" is Not Rejecting Everything

We acknowledge some good things in the Treaty, but cannot support further extension of Union competences while the ethos of democratic exclusion continues to hold sway. The Union leadership has now developed the habit of discarding democratic methods reflexively, if they do not produce the right answer.

Indeed, we fear that the Union may already have gone further than is inherently possible while remaining politically legitimate. The choice now is either to go fully federal or to revert to a community of more or less equal states. Lisbon is an unsatisfactory mish-mash from this perspective.

The Commission's sole power to initiate legislation, including repealing measures, is increasingly anachronistic in democratic terms now that so many of the laws governing us are made in this way.

We don't accept that non-ratification will lead to "the sky falling in". The ECB, for example, is not helping us as a reward or a bribe. (But if it is , it will stop on Monday whether we vote "Yes" or "No").

Whether "Yes" or "No", Ireland will still be near the top of the table of countries supportive of the EU. Even "No" voters are 2-to-1 in favour of membership.

Some "Yes" people want an EU government instead of an Irish one, arguing that native rule has failed. That is a dangerous fantasy and one which the EU itself will not indulge.

The apparent requirement on EU Commission staff from top to bottom to be not merely functionaries but enthusiasts and proselytisers for "the project" is worrying for an ostensibly democratic entity.

Brendan Nix S.C., Joe Noonan, Solicitor, Fergus O'Rourke B.L., John McGuiggan B.L.

[ends]

In "The Irish Times" on Saturday, Derek Scally wrote movingly

Since Ireland’s No to Lisbon, the Irish in Germany have been made to feel like ingrates. Wherever you go, the same insinuation:"Three decades of EU cash and then you give us the finger."

...The fact is that, when explaining why the first Lisbon referendum fell, there are four million Irish people in the EU who believe the complicated version and 82 million Germans who don’t. We are on the wrong side of the argument, and not just with the Germans. Next week, nearly half a billion people across the EU will reach their own conclusions about the second vote. If Ireland votes No again, there is little we can do to stop them thinking that we took the money and ran.

This is where the Lisbon debate in Ireland misses the point entirely: if Ireland votes No a second time, it is up to our EU neighbours - not us - to decide how we will be treated in the future. We may not be thrown to the wolves, but politicians in Germany will certainly keep in mind their electorate’s dim view of Ireland when they consider any kind of alliances with their colleagues from Dublin.

... Like all Irish living around Europe... if our countrymen vote No, we are the ones who will first feel the chill.

Some of the on-line commenters to the article (which you can see below the article itself) have punctured his typically (for the Irish mainstream media on this topic) tendentious picture. I would add

• According to a Forsa poll commissioned by More Democracy, 82% of Germans believe that citizens in each of the EU member states should be able to vote directly on an EU constitution

• In yesterday's German elections, I note that at least two parties with Lisbon-sceptic tendencies gained in vote share

In "The Irish Times" on Saturday, Derek Scally wrote movingly

Since Ireland’s No to Lisbon, the Irish in Germany have been made to feel like ingrates. Wherever you go, the same insinuation:"Three decades of EU cash and then you give us the finger."

...The fact is that, when explaining why the first Lisbon referendum fell, there are four million Irish people in the EU who believe the complicated version and 82 million Germans who don’t. We are on the wrong side of the argument, and not just with the Germans. Next week, nearly half a billion people across the EU will reach their own conclusions about the second vote. If Ireland votes No again, there is little we can do to stop them thinking that we took the money and ran.

This is where the Lisbon debate in Ireland misses the point entirely: if Ireland votes No a second time, it is up to our EU neighbours - not us - to decide how we will be treated in the future. We may not be thrown to the wolves, but politicians in Germany will certainly keep in mind their electorate’s dim view of Ireland when they consider any kind of alliances with their colleagues from Dublin.

... Like all Irish living around Europe... if our countrymen vote No, we are the ones who will first feel the chill.

Some of the on-line commenters to the article (which you can see below the article itself) have punctured his typically (for the Irish mainstream media on this topic) tendentious picture. I would add

• According to a Forsa poll commissioned by More Democracy, 82% of Germans believe that citizens in each of the EU member states should be able to vote directly on an EU constitution

• In yesterday's German elections, I note that at least two parties with Lisbon-sceptic tendencies gained in vote share

My negative attitude to the Lisbon Treaty is connected with the issue of Turkey's possible accession, but not in the obvious way.

There are quite a few good reasons to be opposed to, or at least very sceptical of, the accession of Turkey to the EU. I am not going to discuss them, or even the very persuasive arguments from the other side, in this article. I explain why below.

Like Ireland's "bail-out" for its banks, or its cutting of public sector pay, Turkey's accession may just be "one of those things" that have to be accepted (albeit at a high political price) by those who have played no active part in creating the circumstances that have left no other reasonable options open.

For nearly 50 years now, the leaders of what is now the EU have held open the prospect of full membership to Turkey. As with all aspirant members, this has not been unconditional, and problems with those conditions remain (and constitute some of the good reasons for resisting entry). However, Turkey has taken great steps to approach fulfilment of them, and has done so in great measure explicitly for the purpose of moving closer "to Europe".

The electorates of the Union, and that includes those of Greece, Austria and Cyprus, to name but three at random, can not reasonably pretend that this was done behind their backs, or that they were unaware of it before they joined. It may simply be too late to "slam the door" on Turkey now, for reasons of practical geo-politics as well as "honour": we are responsible for the promises repeatedly made on our behalf, at least to some extent, especially when they are not made in secret.

But ...

Does this situation not illustrate the problem of the democratic legitimacy of the Union's governance arrangements ? It is at least arguable that we have been "bounced" into this by Euro-fanatics, to whom the addition of Turkey is an essential part of their sacred "Project"(about the meaning of which it is extremely difficult to get them to be explicit), and who substantially control the setting of EU agendas.

It is not that these fanatics are all bad people, nor that they are not entitled to their (in parts admirable) project, nor that they are always illegitimate in their influence upon the agendas: it is that through their constant control of the Commission and its bureaucracy (to be accentuated by Lisbon), which permits pretty close to a monopoly of initiative at EU level, they are not only immune to, but are insulated from, public opinion in a fashion that is dangerously anti-democratic. One of Declan Ganley's (relatively few) good points is his emphasis on the inability of ordinary voters to vote for or against those with the power to propose legislation.

(Euro-sceptics, no matter how mild, can not get nominated or approved for appointment, and employees who express dissent tend to get dismissed for "disloyalty".)

If being opposed to a change in the laws constituent of the EU means that I am an opponent of the EU, can I not oppose any change to our own Constitution in future without being labelled as anti-national ?

My negative attitude to the Lisbon Treaty is connected with the issue of Turkey's possible accession, but not in the obvious way.

There are quite a few good reasons to be opposed to, or at least very sceptical of, the accession of Turkey to the EU. I am not going to discuss them, or even the very persuasive arguments from the other side, in this article. I explain why below.

Like Ireland's "bail-out" for its banks, or its cutting of public sector pay, Turkey's accession may just be "one of those things" that have to be accepted (albeit at a high political price) by those who have played no active part in creating the circumstances that have left no other reasonable options open.

For nearly 50 years now, the leaders of what is now the EU have held open the prospect of full membership to Turkey. As with all aspirant members, this has not been unconditional, and problems with those conditions remain (and constitute some of the good reasons for resisting entry). However, Turkey has taken great steps to approach fulfilment of them, and has done so in great measure explicitly for the purpose of moving closer "to Europe".

The electorates of the Union, and that includes those of Greece, Austria and Cyprus, to name but three at random, can not reasonably pretend that this was done behind their backs, or that they were unaware of it before they joined. It may simply be too late to "slam the door" on Turkey now, for reasons of practical geo-politics as well as "honour": we are responsible for the promises repeatedly made on our behalf, at least to some extent, especially when they are not made in secret.

But ...

Does this situation not illustrate the problem of the democratic legitimacy of the Union's governance arrangements ? It is at least arguable that we have been "bounced" into this by Euro-fanatics, to whom the addition of Turkey is an essential part of their sacred "Project"(about the meaning of which it is extremely difficult to get them to be explicit), and who substantially control the setting of EU agendas.

It is not that these fanatics are all bad people, nor that they are not entitled to their (in parts admirable) project, nor that they are always illegitimate in their influence upon the agendas: it is that through their constant control of the Commission and its bureaucracy (to be accentuated by Lisbon), which permits pretty close to a monopoly of initiative at EU level, they are not only immune to, but are insulated from, public opinion in a fashion that is dangerously anti-democratic. One of Declan Ganley's (relatively few) good points is his emphasis on the inability of ordinary voters to vote for or against those with the power to propose legislation.

(Euro-sceptics, no matter how mild, can not get nominated or approved for appointment, and employees who express dissent tend to get dismissed for "disloyalty".)

If being opposed to a change in the laws constituent of the EU means that I am an opponent of the EU, can I not oppose any change to our own Constitution in future without being labelled as anti-national ?

A sample of 66 economists, including an undisclosed number of its own staff, failed to endorse "independent" consultancy Indecon's thesis, echoing political party posters on hoardings across the land, that a positive result in next month's referendum would lead to a Land of Milk and Honey an increase in Ireland's export earnings.

For details, including other tendentious presentations of the survey results, and comments by me, read the article here which includes a link to the report. (PDF)

This PDF document, accessible through the Bonde link on my compendium of Lisbon Treaty Material, clearly and most readably shows, article by article - but only a few words for each - the changes to be wrought by the Treaty. Very usefully, it also identifies the elements of the EU Constitution document which have been dropped or changed.

This PDF document, accessible through the Bonde link on my compendium of Lisbon Treaty Material, clearly and most readably shows, article by article - but only a few words for each - the changes to be wrought by the Treaty. Very usefully, it also identifies the elements of the EU Constitution document which have been dropped or changed.